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INTRODUCTION 
 A number of domestic airline mergers—the TWA/Ozark, Northwest/Republic, British 
Air/British Caledonia, and Air France/Air Inter pairings being most notable—occurred in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s (Pustay, 1992). The high profile nature of these mergers led to a 
substantial amount of Industrial Organization (IO) literature that split along the familiar 
market-power (Kim and Singal, 1993; Werden, Joskow and Johnson, 1991; Borenstein, 1989; 
U.S. General Accounting Office, 1988) versus efficiency-gains (Brueckner and Spiller, 1994; 
Brueckner, Dyer and Spiller, 1992; Brueckner and Spiller, 1991; Levine, 1987) lines. As for 
what drove merger activity, one could extrapolate the following from the literature: the 
market-power camp favoring merged airlines’ ability to raise fares via reduced competition, 
and the efficiency-gains camp favoring merged airlines’ ability to reduce costs via hub-and-
spoke networks. Yet, the IO literature was less concerned with merger motives and more 
concerned with the social welfare implications of airline consolidation. 
Beyond understudying motivations, the IO literature neglected the international 
dimensions (cross-national scope and international competitive incentives) of the domestic 
airline merger phenomenon. First, despite the occurrence of many non-US airline mergers, 
the IO literature strictly considered US domestic merger activity; thus, failing to take the 
appropriate cross-national perspective.1 Second, the IO literature focused on the domestic 
competitive effects of mergers; thus, paying little heed to any strategic relationship between 
domestic mergers and international competitive outcomes. While two recent ‘revisionist’ IO 
articles—Morrison and Winston (2000) and Clougherty (2002)—begin exploring the 
international competitive incentives behind domestic airline mergers, even these works 
restrict the scope to US mergers. 
                                                 
1 British Airways purchased its largest domestic competitor (British Caledonia) and a significant share of the commuter 
carrier Brymon. Canadian Airlines completed a series of mergers that resulted in a domestic market duopoly. AirFrance 
acquired its largest domestic competitor (AirInter), another competitor (UTA), and a French commuter carrier. KLM used 
acquisitions to control the Dutch domestic market. SwissAir acquired a stake in CrossAir, and there are further examples of 
domestic consolidation. (Pustay, 1992) 
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Sizable US domestic markets favor domestic competitive incentives primarily driving 
US mergers; yet, neglecting international competitive incentives appears problematic when 
one realizes the cross-national nature of the airline merger phenomenon. Many mergers 
occurred in nations where international markets outweigh domestic markets; in such markets, 
firms would seemingly consider the international incentives behind domestic actions.2 
Domestic airline mergers also occurred in some nations (e.g., France) prior to domestic 
deregulation; in such markets, mergers might seemingly be a response to international 
competitive realities—not regulated domestic realities. In short, a comprehensive study of the 
world domestic-airline merger phenomenon requires understanding the cross-national scope 
of the phenomenon, and that the drivers (or competitive effects) of merger activity might be 
international as well as domestic in nature. 
Accordingly, this work aims to enhance the existing IO literature regarding the 
domestic airline merger phenomenon of the late 1980s and early 1990s via three means. First, 
by considering the motivations and drivers—not the social welfare implications—behind 
domestic airline merger activity. Second, by considering the domestic airline merger 
phenomenon to be cross-national—not restricted to the US—in scale and scope. Third, by 
considering the potential for international competitive incentives—not just the domestic 
competitive incentives—residing behind domestic airline merger activity. Additionally, the 
reasoning and analysis here are primarily economic (IO in particular) in nature; yet, a subtext 
throughout the work is that the International Business (IB) literature complements an IO 
analysis. Specifically, two fundamental tenets of IB (cross-border interactions impact the 
domestic actions of businesses, and the analytical lens should consider cross-national 
business activity--Nehrt, Truitt and Wright, 1970) might have helped the IO literature realize 
the cross-national scope and the international competitive incentives involved with the 
domestic airline merger phenomenon. 
                                                 
2 Ninety percent of US airlines’ traffic is domestic, but Canadian carriers find international markets equaling the size of 
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Though I attempt to deliver on the specific aims above with regard to improving the 
IO literature on domestic airline mergers, the paper consists of one overriding main 
contention: domestic airline mergers were driven by international competitive incentives in 
addition to the domestic competitive incentives focused on by the pre-existing literature. The 
logic behind this argument is as follows: domestic airline mergers enhance domestic 
networks; domestic networks generate crucial passenger traffic that increases the efficiency 
of international operations; and more-efficient airlines earn greater traffic and profits in 
imperfectly competitive international markets. In sum, airlines—circa the late 1980s—faced 
a strategic rationale to enhance domestic networks via mergers in order to improve 
international competitiveness. 
 In order to both frame the main contention and formally set testable propositions, the 
paper proceeds as follows. The next section nests the main contention within the relevant IO, 
and IB, literature. The subsequent section presents a simple Cournot model that captures the 
essentials of international airline competition and helps generate formal propositions. The last 
substantive section presents panel data empirical tests—covering the international city-pair 
markets between twenty-one advanced aviation nations over the 1983 to 1992 period—that 
support domestic airline mergers which enhance domestic networks and reduce domestic 
competitors as leading to an improved international competitive position.3 The last section 
concludes. 
 
NATIONAL BORDERS, IMPERFECT COMPETITION & NETWORKS 
                                                                                                                                                        
domestic markets, and smaller nations--like the Netherlands--find international markets far outweighing domestic markets. 
3 First, international city-pair markets refer to different sets of origin and destination cities as appropriate airline markets; 
e.g., Boston-London and New York-London are two different markets. Second, the 21 nations--Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States—are referred to as the twenty-one advanced aviation 
nations. The OECD nations and the four more developed Latin American nations were initially selected, but a few OECD 
nations were dropped due to insufficient data. 
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 The fundamental argument of this paper is that--in addition to domestic incentives--
domestic airline mergers were driven by international competitive incentives. Such an 
argument requires establishing the imperfectly competitive nature of airline markets and the 
existence of network economies; yet, the ability to bifurcate the world airline industry into 
domestic and international markets takes first priority. Caves notes that in IB “strategy issues 
become distinctive because the multinational enterprise (MNE) serves product markets 
balkanized by transport costs, government restrictions, and/or differences in tastes and 
production conditions” (1998, p.5). Hence, I must first establish the bifurcation of the world 
airline industry into domestic and international markets before further analyzing the strategic 
dimensions of airline competition.  
 It is generally agreed that city-pair markets are the appropriate level-of-analysis for 
actual airline industry competition (Morrison & Winston, 1987). Gimeno and Woo (1999) 
note that the negligible cross-elasticity of demand across city-pair markets underscores the 
importance of city-pair markets. While the empirical analysis in this work is faithful to the 
importance of analyzing city-pair outcomes, the immediate point is that classifying individual 
city-pair markets into domestic and international markets adds important heuristic insights.  
Domestic city-pair markets have traditionally been the exclusive territory of home-
nation airlines (Pustay, 1992). Beyond the outright curbs on foreign airlines competing in 
domestic markets, foreign airlines have also faced government mandated ownership limits 
that prevent controlling interests in domestic airlines.4 The European Union (EU) has 
recently allowed EU airlines to compete in the domestic markets of member nations; 
however, this freedom did not exist during the period of this study and is still rarely taken-up 
by airlines. Domestic city-pair markets share some common characteristics as they are 
subject to the same national regulatory authority and a common set of potential competitors. 
                                                 
4 Witness the recent difficulties that SwissAir incurred when it took a significant—but not controlling—stake in Sabena 
Airlines of Belgium. 
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Consequently, domestic airline markets are very much--to repeat Caves (1998) term--
‘balkanized’. 
International airline markets—the city-pair markets between different nations—also 
exhibit significant competitive barriers, as they have traditionally been the exclusive territory 
of the pair-nation’s designated airlines. Unlike trade in manufactured goods--which looks to a 
multilateral organization (the WTO) for institutional legitimacy--airline service between two 
nations is legitimized via bilateral treaties (de Murias, 1989). These bilateral treaties 
generally restrict flight authority to airlines from the two treaty nations. For instance, actual 
city-pair flights between Japan and the US will involve only US and Japanese airlines. 
Beyond these country-of-origin limits on the number of competitors in a particular 
international city-pair market, the bilateral treaties often designate which particular airlines 
have the authority to serve certain markets (Dresner & Oum, 1998). For instance, the 
privileged positions of American Airlines and British Airways in the city-pair markets 
linking London with US cities has prevented the two airlines from receiving regulatory 
approval for a strategic alliance, and prevented reform on the US-UK bilateral agreement 
(The Economist, 2002).5 Further, bilateral treaties often involve capacity restrictions for the 
designated airlines: often involving restrictions on flight frequency, and sometimes involving 
restrictions on aircraft type (Dresner & Oum, 1998; Mitchell, 1991) In short, particular 
international city-pair markets are thrice buffered: from worldwide competition; from facing 
the full set of potential pair-nation competitors; and from facing liberal market conditions. 
Nevertheless, airlines generally have the ability to change quantity (seats) supplied in a 
particular international city-pair market. 
                                                 
5 The much-hyped ‘Open-Skies’ treaties of the last decade only remove the restriction on the set of pair-nation competitors, 
and do nothing with regard to the restriction on non pair-nation competitors. In addition, ‘Open-Skies’ treaties have not been 
universally applied to all international city-pair markets—in fact these more ‘liberal’ agreements are still outnumbered by 
the traditional ‘restrictive’ agreements between nations. See Ramamurti & Sarathy (1997) for more details on why many 
nations have not fully embraced this liberalization trend. 
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 The division between domestic and international airline markets owes to the fact that 
national regulatory policies have consistently made a distinction between domestic and 
international airline business. Consider that airlines have traditionally been restricted to status 
as either a domestic (e.g., American Airlines, United Airlines, AirInter) or international 
carrier (e.g., Quantas, British Airways, PanAm). Until the 1980s, only a few airlines (e.g., 
TWA) were granted the exceptional status of being both a prominent domestic and 
international carrier of passengers.6  We also witness variation in the regulatory approaches 
taken by nations with regard to domestic and international markets: sometimes domestic 
markets are regulated while international markets are liberalized; sometimes domestic 
markets are liberalized while international markets are regulated; and sometimes both 
domestic and international markets are similar in their degree of regulation (de Murias, 
1989). The distinction between domestic and international markets is, hence, an important 
one—one that is mirrored in a number of other studies (e.g., Pustay, 1989; Weisman, 1990; 
Ramamurti & Sarathy, 1997; Clougherty, 2001, 2002). Ramamurti and Sarathy capture the 
contradictions of the world airline industry well when they state that “despite its obvious role 
in promoting … globalization … the airline industry itself is one of the least globalized, 
chiefly because governments … have erected large barriers to competition” (1997, p. 391). 
 The bifurcation of the world airline industry into international and domestic markets 
fulfills a necessary economic condition for domestic airline mergers to improve international 
performance. The notion that providing a protected home market promotes an industry's 
international competitiveness goes as far back as Friedrick List's (1966[1885]) late 19th 
century prescriptions for narrowing the British-German industrialization gap. Yet, the 
national-champion rationale was only formalized—under Strategic Trade Theory—in the 
1980s (Brander & Spencer, 1987; Krugman, 1984). While a number of IB/Strategy scholars 
(e.g., Caves, 1982; Stopford, Strange & Henley, 1991) consider domestic monopolization to 
                                                 
6 See Ramamurti & Sarathy (1997) and Pustay (1992) for more details on regulatory obstructions.   
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promote international performance, others (e.g., Porter, 1990) question the impact of softer 
domestic competition on international performance. Accordingly, careful attention must be 
paid to the relevant characteristics of the strategic interaction before applying a national-
champion rationale. 
Krugman (1984) notes that domestic and international markets must be segmented—
firms are able to charge different prices in different markets—for the national-champion 
rationale to hold. As already supported, the world airline industry exhibits this first necessary 
condition with its bifurcation into domestic and international markets. Krugman identifies 
two additional conditions necessary for the national-champion rationale: imperfectly 
competitive markets, and firm economies. In terms of the airline industry: imperfectly 
competitive international markets provide an incentive for airlines to engage in efficiency-
enhancing endeavors since profits accrue to low cost providers; and network economies are 
one means by which airlines reduce costs and earn greater profits. Consequently, domestic 
mergers that increase network size should be sought by airlines in order to improve their 
international competitive position and profitability. The following discussion supports the 
existence of these conditions in the international airline industry and considers their role in 
supporting the main contention.  
 As already noted, international airline markets remain rather restricted despite the 
liberalization of the last two decades. The regulatory and competitive entry barriers involved 
with international markets combine to ensure that strategic behavior determines market 
outcomes; i.e., entry barriers ensure the imperfectly competitive nature of these markets. The 
Cournot model of imperfect competition emphasizes quantity adjustments by a few firms and 
can reflect the long-term implications of international aviation competition. While Graham 
(1998) demonstrates the applicability of such an approach to international competition, Kreps 
and Scheinkman (1983) show that Cournot can apply to two-stage competition where firms 
first set quantity and then compete via prices. Cason (1994) notes that airline industry 
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competition is quite similar with firms first setting quantity via quarterly schedules and then 
competing via prices to fill seats. Even more importantly, a number of scholars (Brander and 
Zhang, 1993, 1990; Oum, Zhang and Zhang, 1993; Weisman, 1990) have empirically 
supported that Cournot models best reflect actual airline competition.  
One of the key dynamics with Cournot-style competition is that the low-cost 
competitors obtain the greatest market share and profits. Consequently, airlines have a 
strategic incentive to reduce costs and garner a larger share of the traffic and profits in 
international markets. It should be noted that the realm of strategic competition supports a 
number of market outcomes, as it is difficult to predict competitor actions in a strategic 
environment. Nevertheless, Kurtz and Rhoades (1992) find evidence supporting a general 
link between profits and market share; and Adrangi, Chow and Gritta (1989) empirically 
support a link between international airline profits and market shares. 
Establishing hub-and-spoke networks is one means by which airlines improve 
efficiency. The efficiency gains of airline networks derive from the existence of density 
economies: cost savings derived from a greater geographic density of customers, as customer 
density allows more intensive capital asset use (Besanko, Dranove & Shanley, 2000). One 
gains an insight into the nature of generic density economies by realizing the rough 
equivalence in geographic area between the US and Canada, and then imagining the 
efficiency benefits of being a national distributor in the US (with a dense population of 280 
mln) compared to a national distributor in Canada (with a sparse population of 30 mln). The 
seminal study of Caves, Christensen and Tretheway (1984) demonstrates the existence of 
density economies for the airline industry. One gains an insight into the nature of airline 
density economies by realizing the high fixed costs (including the acquisition of aircraft, 
maintenance facilities, gate space, takeoff rights, and even personnel) and low marginal costs 
(the extra fuel and food consumed by an additional passenger) of providing airline service. 
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Consequently, average costs decrease significantly on a route and in a network with increased 
passenger numbers; i.e., airlines exhibit substantial density economies. 
 Most scholars credit density economies with explaining the rise of hub-and-spoke 
networks in the deregulated US environment (Levine, 1987; Brueckner et al., 1991, 1992, 
1994; Borenstein, 1992). The matching of domestic routes into an integrated national 
network is certainly driven by density economies; yet, these efficiencies are not restricted to 
the US or to domestic markets. Domestic networks also generate significant international 
efficiencies (Weisman, 1990; Pustay, 1992; Dresner, 1994). Matching international with 
domestic-feeder flights ensures that airlines take advantage of density economies by 
funneling passengers onto international routes. In short, density economies yield significant 
competitive implications for airlines as domestic networks impact international business 
outcomes. 
 Integrating routes into a network brings up the issue of scope economies, which are 
sometimes credited with explaining the rise of hub-and-spoke networks (Weisman, 1990). 
Economies of scope generally refer to the production of two goods or services being 
managed more efficiently by one firm than by two firms (Panzar & Willig, 1981; Porter, 
1985). If one airline more efficiently provides service in two city-pair markets than could two 
airlines, then scope economies are indicated. By matching an international service (N.Y. to 
London) with a domestic service (L.A. to N.Y.), an airline increases the number of 
passengers on each leg and reduces the average cost per passenger via density economies. 
The matching of different city-pair markets into a network brings about cost reductions; thus, 
economies from hub-and-spoke networks are often rightly referred to as scope economies 
(Besanko, Dranove & Shanley, 2000). For convenience, the economies generated by airline 
networks will be referred to as scope economies or network economies in the remainder of 
this work. It is important to underscore, however, that these economies are founded on the 
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existence of density economies--the matching of different airline routes promotes greater 
traffic density and increased capital asset utilization. 
 
 
A COURNOT MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE COMPETITION 
 The previous section attempts to set a thorough theoretical background by discussing 
the critical conditions for the main contention to hold. This section takes a more formal 
approach by presenting a simple model that captures the essentials of the world airline 
industry, illustrates the international incentive behind domestic merger activity, and formally 
yields propositions for empirical testing. The aim then is to establish a complete theoretical 
foundation involving both analytical richness and formal precision. The Cournot model set 
out below owes its domestic-international approach to Brander and Spencer (1987) and draws 
strongly for its aviation applicability from Weisman (1990).  
 The cost function formulation underpins the model by creating the different market 
equilibrium outcomes. The total cost function takes the form:  
TC = c ∑ Xi  - s * X1  * X2  .....  * Xn 
Where X denotes quantity (passengers served in a city-pair market), i is an index of the 
number of routes in the network (i = 1,...,N), and s is a scope coefficient (where s>0) that 
broadly captures the efficiency effect of matching routes (Weisman, 1990).  Constant average 
costs (c'=0) are assumed; hence, neither economies of scale nor density economies are 
specified. The omission of scale economies is in line with previous research (Caves, 1962; 
Douglas & Miller, 1974; Keeler, 1978; White, 1979; Caves, Christensen & Tretheway, 
1984), but as already stated, density economies are crucial to hub-and-spoke network 
economies. Instead of stipulating declining average costs, this model broadly captures 
network efficiency with the multiplicative term at the end of the cost function--the 
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multiplicative term can be considered the cost savings of integrating routes within a 
network.7  
 Three cases are presented to sharpen this analysis: the first case (Case A) examines 
international duopoly competition without domestic feed flights, the second case (Case B) 
examines international duopoly competition where one competitor has a domestic feed flight 
but faces a domestic competitor, and the third case (Case C) examines international duopoly 
competition where one competitor monopolizes the domestic route. These cases generate two 
propositions that underpin the main contention. 
 
Case A: International Competition without Feeder Flights 
 
Figure 1: Case A 
NY
LA
 Firm D
Firm C
Mkt #2 ** UK*Mkt #1
 Firm A
Firm B
 
 
 
 This first scenario (illustrated in figure 1) has firms A and B competing in the 
international market (market #1) between points NY and UK, and firms C & D competing in 
the domestic market (market #2) between points LA and NY. Firms have no matching flights 
and reap no scope economies. Assuming identical cost functions and symmetrical inverse 
demand leads to the following solution equations:  
X*A,1 = X*B,1 = X*C,2 = X*D,2  =  (a-c)/3b      (a.1) 
Π*A = Π*B = Π*C = Π*D = (a-c)2 /9b.       (a.2) 
                                                 
7 Theorists have modeled airline competition with greater specification of density economies (Brueckner et. al., 1991, 1992, 
1994; Oum, Park & Zhang, 1995).  Instead of broadly capturing network efficiencies as this model does, they stipulate 
decreasing average costs with more passengers in a route.  However, the competitive implications of these models and the 
model presented here are similar: airlines with larger networks have lower costs and compete more effectively. 
   
 
 13
 
Firms split the market output and profits in both the domestic and international markets for 
this standard Cournot duopoly outcome. This simplest of cases acts as a useful benchmark for 
comparison with the next two cases. 
 
Case B: International Competition with Domestic Feed and Competition 
       Figure 2: Case B 
 
NY
LA
 Firm A
Firm C
Mkt #2 ** UK*Mkt #1
 Firm A
Firm B
 
 
 
 
 The second scenario has firms A and B again competing in the international market 
(market #1) between points NY and UK (illustrated in figure 2). However, firm A replaces 
firm D--firm D leaves the market or is acquired--in the domestic market between points LA 
and NY (market #2) and competes against firm C. While firms B & C have simple cost 
functions, firm A matches flights and takes advantage of scope economies—firm A’s cost 
function takes the form: 
TC(A) = c (XA,1 + XA,2) - s XA,1 XA,2 .      (b.1) 
 Again, assume identical demand functions in markets #1 and #2; further, consumers 
are allowed to purchase flight segments in bundled and unbundled forms. Note, however, that 
the solutions are not sensitive to these simplifying assumptions. The solution equations yield 
symmetrical results for equilibrium market outputs: 
X*A,1 = X*A,2  = (a-c) / (3b-2s)        (b.2) 
X*B,1 = X*C,2  = (a-c) (b-s) / b (3b-2s) .      (b.3) 
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 Firm A has a larger output than both its competitors in markets #1 and #2 if b>s; i.e., 
the slope of demand curve is greater than the scope coefficient. This condition simply ensures 
that the scope economies are not so great that the market equilibrium is beyond where the 
market demand curve lies above the supply curve; similar conditions for other comparisons 
follow. It can correspondingly be shown that firm A earns greater profits in both markets 
compared to its competitors. Firm A’s total profit is: 
Π*A = (2b-3s) (a-c)2 / (3b-2s) 2 .       (b.4) 
 Matching flights enables firm A to be the dominant player in both the international 
and domestic markets. Compared to Case A, where firm A competed against firm B without 
the aid of domestic feed, firm A’s international market output and profits have risen. It can be 
shown that firm A’s international output (market #1) has risen with the addition of a domestic 
route (market #2), as the right hand side of equation (b.2) is larger than the right hand side of 
equation (a.1), provided that (a > c and b > 2/3s). It can also be shown that firm A’s 
international market profit has risen compared to Case A when it had no domestic routes. 
One half of the right hand side of equation (b.4) gives the profits earned by firm A in the 
international market (market #1), and this is larger than the international profits without 
domestic feed (equation: a.2), provided that (a>c and b>3/2s). The model illustrates how the 
presence of domestic feed can improve the competitive position of an international carrier, as 
summarized in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: The matching of domestic routes with an international route enhances 
an airline’s share of the traffic and profits in the international market. 
 
 
Case C: International Competition with Domestic Monopolization 
 
       Figure 3: Case C 
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 The third scenario (illustrated by figure 3) has firms A and B again competing in the 
international market (market #1) between points NY and UK. In this scenario, however, firm 
A no longer faces domestic competition as firm C has either left the market or been acquired. 
Both cost functions and the market #1 inverse demand function remain identical to Case B; 
however, the inverse demand function for market #2 now reflects firm A’s monopoly 
position. Solving for the output equilibria we obtain: 
X*A,1 =  (a-c) (b+s) / (3b2 - s2)        (c.1)  
X*A,2  = (a-c) (3b+s) / 2(3b2 - s2)       (c.2) 
X*B,1 = (a-c) (2b+s) (b-s) / 2b (3b2-s2) .      (c.3) 
 Unsurprisingly, we observe that Firm A’s international market output dominates firm 
B’s (c.1 > c.3). More importantly, firm A’s international output has increased compared to 
the Case B scenario; the right hand side of (c.1) is greater than that of (b.2), provided (b > s). 
It can correspondingly be shown that Firm A’s international profit increases in this domestic 
monopolization case compared to when Firm A had a domestic competitor (Case B). These 
results suggest international competitive gains for airlines that eliminate domestic 
competition and allow the generation of a simple proposition: 
Proposition 2: The reduction of domestic route competition—potentially via a 
merger—enhances an airline’s share of the traffic and profits in the international 
market. 
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 The simple model of international airline competition, with its imperfectly 
competitive nature and role for network economies, illustrates potential international 
competitive gains for airlines matching domestic and international routes. Case A 
demonstrated international competition without domestic feeder routes and had the two 
competitors split market output and profits evenly. Case B exhibited how adding a domestic 
feeder route--possibly through merger or acquisition--increases an airline’s international 
market output and profits (Proposition 1). Finally, Case C showed how mergers that eliminate 
domestic competitors may further increase an airline’s international market output and profits 
(Proposition 2). Propositions 1 and 2 underscore that airlines improve international 
competitiveness by enhancing domestic networks and reducing domestic competition—both 
byproducts of domestic merger activity. 
 
EMPIRICAL TESTS AND RESULTS 
 The empirical tests examine whether domestic networks (in line with proposition 1) 
and actual domestic mergers (in line with proposition 2) act to improve an airline’s 
international competitive position. The intuition behind the tests is that large domestic 
networks—and the elimination of domestic competitors—allow an airline to take advantage 
of network economies and become a more efficient and dominant international market 
competitor. If larger domestic networks and actual domestic mergers improve an airline’s 
international competitive position, then it behooves airlines to seek domestic mergers; i.e., 
domestic airline mergers entail an international—as well as domestic—competitive incentive.  
 
Data Set Description 
 The panel data for the empirical tests involve 24,808 observations covering the 
international airline markets between the twenty-one advanced aviation nations. Each panel 
consists of one airline’s performance in a specific international city-pair market; for instance, 
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the performance by British Airways in the London-Montreal market is one panel consisting 
of ten observations (1983-1992). International market performance data derive from the 
International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) ‘Traffic by Flight Stage’ series.8 
Additionally, data representing airline network size derive from the ICAO’s ‘Traffic’ series. 
 The dependent variable must capture an airline’s competitive performance in 
international markets. An airline’s share of revenue passengers carried in a particular 
international city-pair market for a specific year acts as the dependent variable (referred to as 
Market-Share). Market-Share captures an airline’s international competitive performance in a 
specific market; and as already mentioned, market share is assumed to correlate positively 
with market profitability.  
 Testing proposition 1—domestic networks improve international competitiveness—
requires a measure of domestic network size. An airline’s number of annual domestic 
departures acts as the measure of domestic network size (referred to as Domestic-Network). 
Domestic departures roughly capture domestic network size by representing the large set of 
domestic flights on which an airline can draw upon in order to establish an efficient domestic 
network. Expect a positive coefficient estimate, as airlines with many domestic departures—
large domestic networks—should be more competitive in international markets. 
Testing proposition 2—domestic mergers improve international competitiveness—
requires a measure of actual merger activity. Using secondary sources (Pustay, 1992; Oum, 
Taylor & Zhang, 1993) twelve airlines were identified over the 1983-1992 period as 
engaging in domestic airline mergers.9 This data allowed the creation of a merger dummy 
                                                 
8 Unfortunately, the Traffic by Flight Stage series measures segment traffic and includes passengers flying between two 
international cities that have origins or destinations beyond these cities.  General opinion holds that origin-and-destination 
(O&D) data most reflect airline industry competition, but such data do not exist on a cross-national basis for the period of 
study. International segment data are the best available alternative.  Unreported tests--based on data that aggregate 
international city-pair markets into country-pair markets--provide qualitatively similar results and support these tests 
reflecting O&D competition. 
9 The following 12 airlines--for the 1983-1992 period and from the data set--were found to engage in their first domestic 
merger in the following years: Alaska Airlines, 1987; American Airlines, 1987; Air France, 1988; Braniff, 1988; British 
Airways, 1987; Canadian Airlines, 1986; Continental Airlines, 1986; Delta, 1986; KLM, 1988; Northwest, 1986; Piedmont, 
1985; TWA, 1986. 
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variable (referred to as Merger-Dummy) that was coded 1 in years subsequent to a merger. 
Expect a positive coefficient estimate, as airlines engaging in mergers reap international 
competitive gains from both larger post-merger domestic networks and reduced domestic 
competition.  
Finally, the list of explanatory variables includes two measures of the number of 
competitors faced in a particular international market. The number of home-based and 
foreign-based competitors faced by an airline in a specific international city-pair market 
(referred to as Home-Competitors and Foreign-Competitors respectively) captures simple but 
important drivers of actual airline market shares. Expect both Home-Competitors and 
Foreign-Competitors to have negative coefficient estimates, as the presence of an additional 
competitor in a market will clearly lower an airline’s market share. Table 1 reports the 
standard descriptive statistics—means and correlation coefficients—for all of the above 
variables. 
*** Place Table 1 Near Here *** 
 
Econometric Issues 
 Proper analysis of the data requires immediate consideration of three econometric 
issues (reciprocal causation; the panel properties of the data; non-linearity in the explanatory 
variables), and later consideration of a fourth issue (interpreting partial and full merger 
effects). Factoring these econometric issues helps in making proper econometric tests. 
First, reciprocal causation is evident when the dependent variable (Market-Share in 
this case) precedes the explanatory variable (Neter, Wasserman & Kutner, 1983). The 
dangerous econometric implication of reciprocal causation is that the endogenous 
explanatory variable might be influenced by the stochastic disturbance term; hence, implying 
the possibility of spurious causal inferences (Maddala, 1992). The coefficient estimates for 
non-treated endogenous explanatory variables may not be consistent: i.e., they may not 
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converge on their true values as the sample size increases (Gujarati, 1988). Nevertheless, a 
series of unreported Granger (1969) tests indicate that none of the reported explanatory 
variables exhibits evidence of reciprocal causation. Hence, reciprocal causation does not 
appear to be of particular concern for the proposed regression equations. 
Second, an obvious issue regards taking advantage of the data’s panel-nature by 
controlling for any panel-specific effects owing to an airlines particular position in an 
individual international city-pair market (i.e., the panel). Further, time-specific trends in 
international airline markets may also affect causal inferences on the explanatory variables. 
The airline industry has been subject to a number of changes in regulation and airline strategy 
over the 1983-1992 period (Ramamurti & Sarathy, 1997); consequently, introducing period 
effects can at least partially control for some of the time-specific trends. Accordingly, all of 
the reported regression equations take advantage of the data’s panel nature by invoking a 
fixed-and-period effects model specification—i.e., both panel and time effects are controlled 
for. The choice of fixed-effects over random-effects is supported by a Hausman (1978) test. 
Third, the regression models are assumed to be linear; however, the variables 
themselves may be non-linear in functional form (i.e., subject to increasing or decreasing 
returns). Potential non-linearity in the Home-Competitors and Foreign-Competitors variables 
is particularly important to capture, as these variables are charged with controlling for both 
the nature of the imperfectly competitive environment and the source (home or foreign) of 
actual competition. If the competitor variables capture as much variation in the dependent 
variable as possible, then we can interpret the coefficient estimates of the main explanatory 
variables with more precision: i.e., the Domestic-Network and Merger-Dummy variables will 
then account for any deviation between competitor-projected market share and actual market 
share. F-tests for the incremental contribution of an added explanatory variable (Gujarati, 
1988) were used to gather which explanatory variables were subject to non-linearity and to 
what degree. 
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 Regression models #1-#3 presented in Table 2 incorporate the concerns outlined 
above. All three regression models employ a fixed-and-period effects model specification; 
hence, the panel nature of the data is appropriately controlled. Regression #1 presents a 
regression model with all the explanatory variables expressed in first-order form. Regression 
#2 presents a regression model with the addition of squared terms for those variables—Home-
Competitors and Foreign-Competitors—which passed the F-test for introducing an additional 
explanatory variable. Regression #3 presents a regression model with the addition of cubed 
terms for those variables—Home-Competitors and Foreign-Competitors—which passed the F-
test for introducing an additional explanatory variable. Regression #3 provides the most 
comprehensive—and conservative—coverage of the above econometric issues; hence, it is 
represented here as follows: 
Market-Shareit = b0 + b1 (Domestic-Network)it + b2 (Merger-Dummy)it  + j=1∑3 bj+2 (Home-
Competitors)jit + j=1∑3 bj+5 (Foreign-Competitors)jit + εit + αi + γt 
where i indexes an airline’s international city-pair market, t indexes time, j allows for a 
convenient expression of the non-linear variables, αi represents the panel specific (fixed) 
effect, and γt captures the period specific effect. 
 
Results & Interpretation 
The estimation results for Regression’s #1-#3 are presented in Table 2. The three 
models generate statistically significant results that conform to expectation: the R-squares are 
above .85 for all the regressions; and all the coefficient estimates for the principal 
explanatory variables have the expected sign and are significant at the 1% or 5% level. While 
the estimation results conform across models, Regression #3 (where both the squared and 
cubed terms for Home-Competitors & Foreign-Competitors are introduced) appears to yield 
more modest coefficient-estimate interpretations. For this reason, and for brevity, the 
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following analysis concentrates on Regression 3: the most comprehensive and conservative 
regression model. 
Regression 3 estimates a fixed-and-period effects model specification that yields an 
R-square of .883; hence, the model appears relatively well specified. Further—and more 
importantly—all the coefficient estimates meet expectation and are significant at the 1-% 
level (except for the Merger-Dummy variable's coefficient estimate at the 5-% level). The 
coefficient estimate for Domestic-Network is 1.36; which implies that an airline increasing 
annual domestic departures by 100,000 increases international city-pair market shares by 
1.36 percentage points on average. The coefficient estimate for Merger-Dummy is 1.11; 
which implies that airlines engaging in domestic mergers increase annual international 
departures by 100,000 increases international city-pair market shares by 1.11 percentage 
points on average. The coefficient estimate for Home-Competitors indicates declining market 
shares with increased counts of home competitors on a route; yet, the squared and cubed 
terms indicate that the decline is partially moderated at higher levels of home competition. 
The coefficient estimate for Foreign-Competitors indicates declining market shares with 
increased counts of foreign competitors on a route; yet, the squared and cubed terms indicate 
that the decline is reversed when airlines begin to face three or more competitors on an 
international route. 
*** Place Table 2 Near Here *** 
 Recall that we are most concerned with the Domestic-Network and Merger-Dummy 
variables. While the above analysis and the Table 2 empirical results report a statistically 
significant coefficient estimate for both variables, this should not surprise in light of the large 
number of observations (24,808). The economic significance of the coefficient estimates is 
far more important than statistical significance. Consider the following actual merger-
induced changes to domestic network size to better understand the economic significance of 
domestic airline networks. Northwest increased its domestic network size by 323,000 annual 
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domestic departures when it acquired Republic Airlines; thus, the coefficient estimate 
suggests that Northwest increased its post-merger international city-pair performance by 4.4 
percentage points. Similar use of the Domestic-Network coefficient estimate allows 
approximating the international market gains for other domestic-airline mergers: the Delta-
Western Airlines merger translates into international city-pair market gains of 2.5 percentage 
points; TWA-Ozark translates into market gains of 1.76 percentage points; and the series of 
mergers that led to Canadian Airlines translate into a 1.28 percentage point increase. 
 Additionally, the coefficient estimate for the Merger-Dummy variable should be 
interpreted as representing the impact on international competitiveness of the non-network 
related effects of a merger (since we are holding Domestic-Network constant in the 
regression). The Merger-Dummy variable then represents the efficiency effects due to 
reduced domestic competitors (from proposition 2) and other residual benefits of engaging in 
a domestic merger. Accordingly, the coefficient estimate for the Merger-Dummy variable 
suggests that merging airlines on average reap an additional 1.11 percentage point gain in 
international market shares beyond the impact of enhancing their domestic network.  
 The discussion above illustrates the constraints in interpreting from Regression’s #1-
#3 the net-effect of a typical domestic airline merger on international competitive 
performance. Neither the Domestic-Network nor the Merger-Dummy variable generates 
coefficient estimates representing the full effect of a domestic airline merger on international 
competitive performance; instead, both variables represent partial merger effects. This owes 
to the simple fact that airlines engaging in domestic mergers (represented by Merger-
Dummy) are likely to enhance the size of their domestic network (represented by Domestic-
Network). In order to generate an estimation of the average impact of a domestic merger on 
international competitive performance, I adopt a procedure to allow the coefficient estimate 
for the Merger-Dummy variable to fully represent the merger effect. 
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The procedure is to generate an implied estimate for the Domestic-Network variable 
that strips it of the merger effect with regard to network size (see Clougherty, 2002 for a 
similar treatment). The first step in the procedure involves generating an instrumented 
variable for Domestic-Network by regressing it upon the lagged value for Domestic-Network 
and Merger-Dummy. The second step involves estimating the implied effect of Merger-
Dummy on Domestic-Network by taking the coefficient estimate for Merger-Dummy from 
the above instrumental regression and multiplying it by actual Merger-Dummy variables. The 
third step involves subtracting the implied effect from the instrumented variable to yield an 
implied estimate for Domestic-Network from which the merger effect is removed.  
 Regression #4 is identical to regression #3 with the exception that the implied 
estimate for Domestic-Network (stripped of a merger effect) is substituted for the actual 
network size value. The results of regression #4 conform rather well to those of regression #3 
with the only noticeable difference being that the coefficient estimate for the Merger-Dummy 
variable has increased (from 1.11 to 1.42). The import here is that the coefficient estimate for 
Merger-Dummy can now be interpreted as representing the full effect of a domestic airline 
merger on international competitive performance. In short, airlines engaging in domestic 
merger activities experience post-merger increases of some 1.42 percentage points on 
average in their international city-pair market shares post-merger. 
 In sum, the empirical results clearly support the presence of an international 
competitive incentive behind large domestic airline networks and the completion of domestic 
airline mergers. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 My main contention has been that the domestic airline merger activity of the late 
1980s and early 1990s had an important international dimension, as domestic mergers can 
improve an airline’s international competitive position. The domestic competitive incentives 
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(efficiency-gains and market-power) focused on by the IO literature clearly play a significant 
role in determining airline merger activity; however, a complete explanation of the cross-
national domestic airline merger phenomenon appears to require consideration of 
international incentives. International competitive gains are particularly vital in explaining 
the proliferation of domestic airline mergers to nations where international markets 
predominated and/or where domestic markets remained regulated. 
 The main contention that domestic airline mergers have a significant international 
dimension is supported by a Cournot model of airline competition and by comprehensive 
panel data tests. The simple Cournot model reflects the theoretical backing, generates formal 
propositions, and establishes the logic behind the empirical tests. Further, the model formally 
clarifies the main contention by illustrating that mergers—which enhance domestic networks 
and reduced domestic competitors—generate international competitive gains. The empirical 
results—based on comprehensive panel data covering the international airline markets 
between twenty-one advanced aviation nations over the 1983-1992 period—find large 
domestic networks and actual mergers to improve the international competitive position of 
airlines. Accordingly, the empirical results support an international competitive incentive 
behind seeking large domestic networks and engaging in domestic merger activity. 
Domestic airline mergers appear to have an important international dimension; hence, 
completely understanding the domestic airline merger phenomenon requires analyzing both 
the international context and international determinants of domestic merger activity. An IB 
perspective can then complement the traditional IO approach to airline competition issues by 
widening the analytical frame to include cross-national business activity (e.g., non-US 
domestic airline mergers) and by prodding the discovery of cross-border interactions that 
affect domestic strategies and actions (e.g., international competitive incentives behind 
domestic mergers).  
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In sum, the argument here is simple but important: first, the IO and IB perspectives 
complement each other by helping better diagnose and analyze the motives behind the 
domestic airline merger phenomenon; second, the cross-national domestic airline merger 
phenomenon was driven by international, as well as domestic, competitive incentives. 
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Table 1: Correlation Coefficients & Means for All Variables 
 
 Market-Share Domestic-
Network 
Merger-
Dummy 
Home-
Competitors 
Foreign-
Competitors 
 
Mean 
 
 
66.370 
 
160,729 
 
0.255 
 
0.236 
 
0.649 
Market-Share 
 
1.000         
Domestic-
Network 
-0.099 1.000       
Merger- 
Dummy  
-0.062 0.466 1.00     
Home-
Competitors 
-0.430 0.358 0.212 1.000   
Foreign-
Competitors 
-0.654 -0.069 0.003 0.190 1.000 
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Table 2: Panel Data Regression Results 
• All Models Incorporate a Fixed-&-Period Effects Specification 
 
Dependent Variable: Market-Share 
 
 Regression #1: 
First-Order 
Terms 
Regression #2: 
Squared Terms 
Regression #3: 
Cubed Terms 
Regression #4: 
Cubed Terms & 
Implied-Estimate 
Explanatory 
Variables 
 
    
Domestic-Network 
   - 100,000 departures
1.38 ** 
(0.27) 
1.40 ** 
(0.25) 
1.36 ** 
(0.24) 
1.44 ** 
(0.32) 
 
Merger-Dummy   
 
2.00 ** 
(0.53) 
 
1.15 * 
(0.49) 
1.11 * 
(0.48) 
 
1.42 ** 
(0.47) 
Home-Competitors -11.48 ** 
(0.36) 
 
-19.78 ** 
(0.57) 
 
-27.26 ** 
(0.91) 
 
-27.28 ** 
(0.91) 
 
(Home-Competitors)2  
 
2.87 ** 
(0.16) 
8.70 ** 
(0.59) 
 
8.70 ** 
(0.59) 
 
(Home-Competitors)3  
 
 
 
-0.89 ** 
(0.086) 
 
-0.89 ** 
(0.086) 
 
Foreign-Competitors -22.44 ** 
(0.30) 
 
-39.11 ** 
(0.43) 
-53.37 ** 
(0.64) 
-53.36 ** 
(0.64) 
(Foreign-
Competitors)2 
 
 
 
6.86 ** 
(0.14) 
18.96 ** 
(0.43) 
18.95 ** 
(0.43) 
(Foreign-
Competitors)2 
 
 
  -1.83 ** 
(0.062) 
-1.83 ** 
(0.062) 
Constant 80.92 ** 
(0.48) 
 
86.51 ** 
(0.45) 
88.27 ** 
(0.45) 
88.06 ** 
(0.57) 
 
R-squared 
 
.855 
 
.876 
 
.883 
 
.883 
Observations 24,808 24,808 24,808 24,808 
     
(  ) = Standard Errors; ** = 1% Significance; * = 5% Significance 
 
 
     
 
